RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.

is more strictly required by the Chinese, who, not only punish its
neglect with the most severe penalties, but are also accustomed to
erect monuments to those who are conspicuous for their regard to
filial duty. The early settlers of New England, taking for their
guide that book, the instructions of which they so earnestly endeavored to follow in every respect, adopted the penalty which was
inflicted by the Jewish code upon disobedient children; yet, to their
honor be said, no execution was ever known to have taken place
under so sanguinary a regulation. The common law, except that
it recognizes the right of a parent to chastise his unruly children
is silent upon this subject: its importance has not, however, been
lost sight of, since many of the States have provided means by
which disobedient and stubborn children may be punished.
G. F. R.
Lowell, Massachusetts.
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In the District Court of the Unitod States, Eastern District of
S.Pennsylvania,

July, 1853.,

JAMES M. BOALER vs. WILLIAM CUMMINES, JR.
1. The c'aase of the Constitution and the provisions of the acts of Congress of 1793
and 1850, providing for the rendition of persons held to labor, include apprentices.
2. Where C, had bound himself an apprentices in Delaware, with the assent of his
father, who lived in Pennsylvania, and the latter had, upon one occasion, returned
C, to-his master, from whom he had absconded: held, that C, might be arrested
by virtue of a Commissioners warrant, and remanded to his master as a fugitive.

This was a hearing upon a habeas corpus.
It appeared that William Cummines, Jr., had with the knowledge if not with the assent, of his father, who resided in Pennsylvania, been apprenticed to the claimant under the Delaware Act
of 5th February, 1837, (Rev. L. Delaw., 1852, p. 224,) which provides that minots over fourteen years of age, and not having
parents -or guardian within" the State of Delaware, may validly
apprentice themselves till the age of twenty-one, if with the assent
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of two justices of the peace; that the boy having before escaped
from his master was returned to him by the father; that having
again escaped he was arrested upon a warrant under the "Fugitive
Act" of 1850, carried before the Commissioners, by whom the warrant was issued, and the case partially heard, but, at the suggestion
of the Commissioner, the fugitive was remanded for a further hearing
and this writ taken, returnable before his Honor, Judge Kane.
The Court intimated that the warrant of arrest and the affidavit
of the claimant, on which it issued, constituted a sufficient cause
for holding the boy, and were a good return to the writ; but, at
the desire of the Commissioner, (Charles F. Heazlitt, Esq.,) his
Honor, Judge Kane, sat with the Commissioner as advising him.
The facts being fully proved, Orabbe for the claimant (J. Mfurray
Rush was with him) argued;
I. That this was a case within the Act of 1850, and the 4 art. 2d
sec. 3 cl. of the Constitution, bocause the words of that clause were
in themselves on the common rules of construction as applicable to
apprentices as to slaves, and that those who argued that slaves
only were intended thereby, were bound affirmatively to make out
their position, and that no text writer or judicial decision had ever
expressly confined the operation of the clause of the Constitution
or the Acts of 1793 and 1850, to slaves. That, going further, the
intention of the framers of the Constitution (III Madison Papers,
1446, 1456, 1532, 1558, 1589,) had been to include more that
slaves within that clause, and that such had been the original understanding of the provision. (III. Elliot, Deb. 433, 436.)
That the framers of the Constitution had thought it requisite expressly to include "persons bound to service for a term of years,"
that is, apprentices, among free persons, while, on the other hand,
the New York amended Fugitive Act (2 Rev. and 3d ed. 657) had
deemed it necessary expressly to except them from being included
in the term "persons held to service or labor." (See amended Act,
laws of 1840.
That the same construction had been placed upon the Constitutional provision in Jack vs. Martin, 14 Wend., 522, 524, 525; and
in Johnson vs. Tompkins, Baldw., 571, 578, 584, 585, 590, 598;
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and that Commissioners Ingersoll, (Conn.,) Loring, (Mass.) Scovill,

(N. Y.) and Heazlitt, (Penna.,) had decided apprentices to be within the meaning of the Act of 1850. Commissioner Morton, (N. Y.)
had, however decided otherwise.
II. The indentures, were valid in this Court, because as was in
evidence, they had been impliedly ratified by the father, and because, whether so ratified or not, they were valid under the lex loci
contractus (Story Confl. L. 3d ed. § 100, p. 186; § 108, p. 189.)
Parsons, for the apprentice, argued that this was not a case
where the Commissioner was authorized to issue the warrant of
arrest, neither the Constitution nor the Acts of 1793 and 1850,
being intended to affect any other than slaves; (II Story Const. §
36; III. ib. § 805; Serg. Const. Law, 1st ed., 387, 388. III,
Mad. Papers, 1447; Prigg vs. Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. 611.) and
that this was shown conclusively by the fact that there were no adjudicated cases which decided apprentices to be within the Constitution and Acts of '93 and '50.
That as fugitive slaves were unable to make valid contracts, (Glenn
vs. Hodges, 9 Johns, 67; Comm. vs. Griffith, 2 Pickg. 11, this bdy,
if brought into the same category as a slave, must also be held incapable of Validly binding himself to the claimant, and therefore the
father's right was superior.
That Commissioner Morton's decision was a proper exposition of
the law on the subject.
That quoad, the father .these indentures were of no avail,
he having nevek surrendered his rights over the boy. (III Blackst.,
4; I ib., 386; 4 S. and R., 211; 2 W. and S., 670; Guthrie vs.
Murray, 4 Watts, 80; Commonwealth vs. Crommie, 8 W. and S.,

389.)
Bush, for the claimant, was not heard.
have had my attention called to the clause of the
KANE, J.-I
Constitution, and the Act of Congress of 1793 and 1850, providing for the rendition of persons held to labor, and the node of so
doing, very often; and the result of the attention heretofore bestowed, and the simple nature of the question to be decided, induce me
to give my decision now. Taking the words of the clause of the
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Constitution, and those of the Act of 1850 alone, there can be no
difficulty-the words are, "persons held to service or labor in one
State under the laws thereof." Now I know of no words that could
more clearly include apprentices than those I have quoted, for the
plain effect of the very words of every indenture of apprenticeship
is to hold the party to service; and if I could go beyond the words
of the Act of Congress, and those of the article of the Constitution,
I should say, that every consideration of policy would dictate such
a construction; because to decide the contrary, would be to discharge
every apprentice in Pennsylvania that chose to cross the Delaware,
and every one elsewhere that repaired to this State, and refused to
return to his duty. The relation created by an indenture of apprenticeship is of such a character, that minors and orphans, instead
of remaining ignorant and unprotected, become acquainted with the
arts and sciences, and are fitted for the duties of life; and to preserve such a state of usefulness the principles of extradition should
be applied. It is true that no case has been cited in which a United
States Court or Judge has decided this very question; but, perhaps,
it is because the master has enforced his rights by seizing his apprentice and conveying him home, that this law, and that of 1793
has not been resorted to, and the want of use, or non user, has no
influence upon the construction of a plainly expressed statute.
It is equally clear, that though a Judge in considering the case
of a fugitive slave in connexion with the statute, might speak only
of a slave as within its purview and another in a case like the
present might speak only of apprentices; yet each might with propriety use the words, "a person held to labor." It is equally to
be observed, that no decision has been had in which it has been
held, that the words of the constitution. apply only to slaves. Most
certainly this lad is held by a binding under a local proceeding, within
the authority of any State to provide, and thereby to affect persons
within her limits and subject to her jurisdiction. The marriage of a
minor in Delaware, good by the law of that State, would be good
everywhere else. Now one of the objects of apprenticeship is to
prevent pauperism; and a child whose parents are in another and
a distant State, and who have deserted him, is a pauper, notwith-
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standing the fact of his having lawful protectors who *do not discharge their duty to him, and the disposition of him under the municipal regulations of the State in which he is deserted, is binding
on him, and his parents too. It cannot, however, be said, that in
this case the binding was against the father's will, for it is in proof
before me, that it was with the consent of the father, who sent his son
to Delaware on trial, to be bound if he was liked, and sent him back
to that State after he was bound, when, on one occasion he had absconded. The question, therefore, is between the father and master on this proof; and it cannot be, that the father shall stand by,
and see his son bound in another State, to receive education and
nurture, and just when he becomes valuable to a master, to take
him away; such a course would amount to positive fraud. The
consent is so material that it is not going too far to say, that if a
slave should come here with his master's consent and bind himself
apprentice, or, being here, should so bind himself with the master's
consent, in the first case he would not be a fugitive slave within the
meaning of the act of Congress, and in the second the master would
not be allowed to question the validity of the indenture. This case,
therefore, returns to the Commisioner for adjudication, he being
now in possession of my views on the subject.
Relator remanded to the custody of the Marshal.

In the Supreme Court of New York, April, 1853.
BRADLEY vs. BAXTER.
1. The Act of New York of March 26, 1849, commonly called "the Free School Act,"
under the provisions of which, certain district school taxes were levied, is uncon-

stitutional and void.
2. A legislative body may provide by enactment for the happening of contingent or
uncertain events, but suchk provision must be made to take effect independent of
any decision of an extraneous power, such as a decision at the ballot box by the
people, upon the expediency of the Act itself.
3. By the theory of the New York and all other American Constitutions, assuming
a representative principle as the foundation of government, the legislative power
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is vested in special bodies, which precludes any other body from exercising the
same functions by delegation.
4. An amendment to a void law, cannot make it valid.
OSWEGO GENERAL TERM-Before GRIDLEY, ALLEN, HUBBARD,

and

PRATT,

Justices.

An action was commenced by the plaintiff against the defendants,
trustees of a school district in the village of Whitestown, to recover
for property taken to satisfy a District tax. A portion of the tax
was levied under the Free School Law of 1849. The action was
commenced in August, 1850, and tried before'Judge GRIDLEY, and
a verdict given for the plaintiff. Upon appeal by the defendants
to the General Term, among other points, the question of the constitutionality of the Free School Act was involved.
T. I. Flandeu, for plaintiff.
H. Denio and WF. Tracy, for defendants.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
PRATT, J.-Several objections were taken upon trial of this
cAuse, to the regularity of the proceedings, on the part of the district in levying the tax in question, which it is not nedessary for
me to examine, as we all concur in the conclusion that the Act of
March 26th, 1849, commonly termed the Free School Law, under
the provisions of which a portion of the tax in question was levied,
was not at the time of such a levy, a binding and valid law of theState. It only becomes necessary therefore for me to discuss this
point in the case, and to state briefly some of the reasons upon
which our conclusion is based.
Although the Legislature has since the commencement of this
suit ratified the Act, and legalized all proceedings under it, so that
our decision cannot affect very seriously, or extensively, existing
interests, yet we did not arrive at such conclusion without a deepfelt sense of the responsibility, which the Court would assume, in
pronouncing unconstitutional and void not only this particular Act,
but a whole system of legislation, which has been rapidly increasing of late years, in this, and many of the other States in this
Union.
We recognize the Constitution as the paramount law of theState,
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prescribing the fundamental principles upon which our government
is based; and when a case comes before the Courts, involving the
question whether those principles have been violated, in the action
of any department of the government, we may not evade the responsibility of meeting the question firmly, and deciding it in accordance with our honest convictions in the premises.
As I understand the Act under consideration, and the method of
procedure by which it found a place in our statute books, the simple
question is presented,, whether the Legislature or law-making power
of the State is vested, by the Constitution (with some specified exceptions) exclusively in the Legislature, or whether the power is
only conferred upon that body to be exercised or not at its optionwhether the obligation and duty rests upon that body alone to pass
upon the expediency or inexpediency of all proposed laws-or
whether it may, wheneverit may deem it proper, relieve itself from
such responsibility and refer the question to the people at large to
be decided at the ballot box; the Legislature only acting as a Committee to draw up the law in due form to be thus presented to th~e
people, or some power other than themselves to adopt or reject it.
The proposition thus presented would hardly require comment,
and yet the act in question, if I understafid it, was the result of precisely this kind of legislation. I am aware that it is insisted, and
was strenuously urged upon the argument, that the Legislature has
power to enact conditional laws-laws to take effect upon the happening of some future unknown and contingent effect. Nobody
will contest this proposition. The Legislature may undoubtedly
provide by its enactinents, for anticipated or uncertain events which
may or may not happeni. Most laws are intended to be prospective
in their operation, and they may provide in themselves to take effect only on the happening of some uncertain or contingent event.
Several cases of that kind of legislation were cited upon the argument. Some were cases of laws enacted to take effect, upon the
performance or non-performance of some act by a foreign government, by a municipal corporation, and in some cases by an individual. But in none of these cases was the act of the Legislature
made to take effect upon any decision of this foreign or extrane-
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ous power upon the expediency of the act itself. Those laws were
to take effect upon the happening of certain events, which would
in the opinion of the Legislature, or law-making power, render such
a law expedient and proper for such a state of things. The circumstances to meet which such laws were enacted, were contingent and
uncertain; but the laws themselves expressed the deliberate will of
the law-making power; provided the circumstances should happen
to which the laws themselves were to apply.
But in the case under consideration, the subject matter upon
which the law in question was to operate, was neither contingent
nor uncertain. The necessity for the law was just as imperious before the decision of the people at the ballot box had been ascertained, as it was afterwards. The evils, which the law was designed
to remedy, were neither augmented nor diminished by that decision. Everything, so far as the subject matter of the law was concerned, remained in statu quo.-What then was the condition upon
which the law was to take effect? What was the uncertain and contingent event upon the happening of which it was to become a valid
and binding law? It was simply no more nor less than the decision of the people at the ballot box upon the expediency of the law
itself.-In fine, it was submitting to them the question on the adoption or rejection of the proposed law. Itwas creating a new legislative power, which should exercise one of the most important functions in legislation, to wit: the field of decision of the question of
the adoption or rejection of a proposed bill.
The Act in question, when it came from the hands of the Governor with his signature attached, did not necessarily express the
will of a single member of either house upon the subject matter of
the law. It expressed this much and no more: That it was the
will of the Legislature that the question be submitted to the people
at large to decide, whether it should become the law of the State
or not.-The Governor by signing it only approved of thus submiting the question to the people.-the language of the Act itself
shows clearly that such was the intention of its framers.--(Sec. 10.)
"The electors shall determine by ballot at the annual election to be
held in November next, whether this Act shall or not become a law."
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It will be seen by this provision that the question upon the final
passage of the bill was to be taken at the polls.
And the provisions of the Act, prescribing the heading and form
of the ballots, and the effects which should result upon the majority
of votes being for or against the law, show clearly, that the members of the Legislature intended to evade the responsibility of passing upon the question, whether the Act should or should not become a law. No member of that body who voted for the bill in
its several stages through the two houses, could be charged with
any inconsistency of conduct for being found opposing it at the
polls, ,or vice versa.-No member had voted for a free school law,
but simply to submit the question to the people, and to confer on
them the power to pass or reject the bill. The question then recurs: Is this the kind of legislation within the spirit and meaning
of the Constitution?
It is conceded that it is not expressly forbidden by that instrument; but is it not forbidden by a necessary and reasonable implication ?
"Every government," says an able writer upon constitutional.
law, "must include within its scope, at least if it is to'possess suitable stability and energy, the exercise of the three great powers
upon which all governments are supposed to rest; viz: the executive, the legislative, and the judicial powers. The manner and extent in which these powers are to be exercised, and the functionaries in whom they are vested, constitute the great distinctions which
are known in the forms of government. (Story on Const., Book
2, page 1.) In the States of this Union, whilst all the powers of
government are supposed to emanate from the people, and to be exercised for their benefit, there is no principle more fundamental or
more universally recognized during their whole history than that
these powers are not to be exercised by the people directly, but by
representative bodies, selected from the people to represent them
in this respect. This, and the separation of the great powers of
government into different departments, to be exercised by separate
and distinct functionaries, lie at the very foundation of every State
government.

RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.

Not a State in the Union is there that does not recognize these
principles as primary and fundamental, the very foundation upon
which the permanency and stability of its institutions rests.
The patriots, and statesmen who laid the foundations of these noble political edifices, of which we are all now so justly proud,-of
these institutions of government which should secure to each individual, however humble, all the freedom compatible with the general welfare and safety, were quite as solicitous to guard against the
evils necessarily connected with, and growing out of a consolidated
monarchy. The one was deemed quite as inconsistent as the other
with that great idea which was the pole star of all their efforts and
all their aspirations; Liberty regulated by law!
It cannot be necessary for me to go into an extended discussion
of the importance of this representative principle to a free government, and of the necessity of guarding and cherishing it as the
sheet anchor of the permanency and stability of our free institutions, and of their, efficiency in securing the great objects of all
good governments, to wit: the happiness and prosperity of the
people.
These questions have been so often discussed by others much more
able to do them' justice than myself, that the task is unnecessary.
The reports of the convention that framed the Constitution of the
United States, and the public documents of that day, are full of
able discussions upon this subject, and I may also refer to the opinions of the Judges in two recent decisions in the highest Courts of
the States of Pennsylvania and Delaware, which I shall have occasion hereafter to cite. It only becomes necessary, therefore, I apprehend, to examine and ascertain whether these fundamental
principles are secured to us by the Constitution, or whether they
are left by that instrument to the ever-shifting and ever-changeing legislation of the State. Assuming that this representative
principle lies at the foundation of. our government, and that the
constitution was designed to designate the functionaries by whom,
and the manner and form in which it shall be carried into execution, the question, I apprehend, will be found not difficult of solution.
Upon examining that instrument we find the executive, legisla-
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tive and judicial powers of government properly distributed to separate bodies, and the necessary power delegated to each. In this
distribution the legislative power of the government is declared to
be vested in a Senate and Assembly- The number composing each
branch is fixed, and the manner of their election and the duration
of the term of office is prescribed.
The number necessary to constitute a quorum for the transaction
of business, the number necessary to pass the different kinds of
laws, is there designated-the form of the enacting clause of all
laws is given, and freedom of debate secured.
The provision of that instrument, that the legislative power of the
government shall be vested in a Senate and Assembly, of itself would
seem to preclude the idea that there is any other power authorized
to exercise the same functions. Especially when we observe the
care which the framers of that instrument have taken in organizing
these bodies, and in providing rules by which the merits of proposed
laws may there be discussed freely, and by which no law can be passed without a concurrence of a majority of those elected to each
branch, we cannot resist the conclusion that it was the design of
the Constitution to vest the law-making power in the legislature, and
no where else. It is true that the Governor is endowed with a
qualified veto, and in some peculiar cases the power is given to the
Legislature to refer certain great financial questions to the people.
These are specific powers, defined by the constitution itself, and afford, in my opinion, no authority to the Legislature to refer to the
people other matters, over which no such power is granted. As to
such matters, the exclusive right to legislate is vested in that body,
and that alone.
Whence, then, is the authority derived for the Legislature to divest itself of this power? The mandates of the Constitution are
as binding upon the people in their sovereign as in their individual
capacity. If by the fundamental law the power to make the necessary laws bf the country be delegated to the Legislature, the people cannot, except by changing the Constitution, resume the power.
Again, it is a well settled principle that where a trust or confidence is confided to any person or class of persons, the trustees can-
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not delegate that trust to others. And what trust, what confidence
is more sacred, more responsible, than the power to make the laws
of a free people?
The power is not only delegated to the two branches of the Legislature, but there is an obligation-a duty imposed upon them to
make all such laws as are necessary and proper for the interests of
the people, and good order of the body politic-a duty from which
they may not discharge themselves except by faithfully and honestly discharging that duty. If they may discharge themselves
from the responsbilities wliich the Constitution has devolved upon
them in one case, they may in another, and this most important of
all the functions of government is entirely afloat, vested in fact,
nowhere. If a bill may in this manner be submitted to a vote of
the people at the ballot box for adoption or rejection, it may, so far
as legislative power is concerned, be submitted to the vote of a
mass convention.
Indeed it may be a question whether this would not of the two
be the preferable method.
There would surely be a better opportunity for discussing the
merits of the proposed law, and for consulting among the people
from the diflerent sections of the State. Besides, history furnishes
a precedent somewhat similar in character, in the Athenian Republic, where laws were framed by the Senate to be submitted to an
assembly of the whole people.
But perhaps a mode of procedure still less objectionable might
be suggested. The laws might be passed by the Legislature to
take effect or not upon the approval or disapproval of a select number of persons designated in this Act, thus creating a power in the
State not entirely dissimilar to the old council of revision.
Other methods of relieving the Legislature from the responsibility which rests upon its members might be suggested, but perhaps those already suggested are sufficient. The right to legislate
in this manner was placed upon the argument, almost if not entirely upon the assumption that the Legislature was authorized to pass
conditional laws-thereby assuming that the nature of tle condition could not affect the question. If this assumption be true, then it
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necessarily follows that the submission to the vote of a mass convention, to a select body of men, or even to a foreign potentate,
may be made the subject of a valid condition.
But why should this method of procedure be confined to the lawmaking power of the government? Why not extend it to the executive and judicial departments ? The functions of government
which the latter are called upon to discharge, are no more sacred,
no more important, than those devolving upon the Legislative departments, and the C6nstitution is no more explicit in defining and
limiting their powers and duties.
The Governor is vested by the Constitution with the pardoning
power, and this includes the power to grant, in proper cases, *conditional pardons.
But can it be inferred from this that he may grant a pardon to
be valid or void as the people might vote for or against the pardon
at the next general election ? Would a pardon be valid, even, that
should take effect upon condition that the Legislature should approve of it.
The Courts of law sometimes make conditional orders and sometimes conditional judgments, but have they the power, or could the
Legislature give them the power to give judgments to take effect or
not, as the people of the State or as particular localities might vote
upon the merits of the case?
Supose our new code, among other reforms should contain a provision that in a given class of cases the Courts might pronounce
conditional judgments, to be valid or void, for the plaintiff or defendant, as the people at the next general election should determine!
There is no restriction in express terms in-the Constitution upon the
power of the Legislature in this respect, yet it would be so palpably contrary to its whole scope, and remaining so utterly subversive
of the genius and theory- of our institutions, that even the sanctity
that is thrown around the code itself would scarcely shield such an innovation upon the present practice from universal condemnation, as
being in direct conflict with the Constitution. And still I am unable
to perceive wherein it would differ in principle from the case under
consideration. In either case the exercise in this manner of the
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functions vested in any department of the government would be
utterly subversive of the primary principles of a representative
government, and would be a fearful stride towards that worst of all
despotisms, a consolidated democracy. ' It appears to me to be perfectly manifest, therefore, that such legislation is in direct conflict
with the Constitution.
So far as there is any authority in the books directly upon the
question, the preponderance is decidedly in favor of the conclusion
to which I have come. In this State, our Court sitting in the Seventh District-two justices against one have held the Act in question constitutional.-Justice JOHNSON, who gave the prevailing opinion, concluded that the Legislature had no power to submit directly to the People the question whether a proposed Act should or
should not become a law, but he upheld this law on the assumption
that the Legislature had the right to pass conditional laws, and that
by putting this Act in that form they were enable to evade the objection. (Johnson vs. Rich, 9 Barb. 630.) With all due deference,
it seems to me that the scope and olject of the Legislature should
be regarded rather than the form of the thing, especially when that
object is patent, and manifest upon the Act itself.
But the Court sitting in the Third District has held, as I am informed, the Act unconstitutional in a case not yet reported. These
cases, one or both are now pending in the Court of Appeals.
This kind of legislation has been expressly condemned n two
cases directly in poilt, in the highest Courts of Pennsylvania and
Delaware.-.(Parker vs. Commonwealth, 6 Barr, 507.) Rice vs.
Foster, 4 Harrington, 479.) li the latter State the question was
decided by a concurrence of all the Judges of the Court of Appeals,
composed of the Chancellor and the Judges of the highest law Court
of the State, after argument by the most eminent counsel in the
State. The decision by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was
made by a majority vote. In both cases the several opinions of
the Judges are characterized by great ability, and exhibit a thorough
examination of the fundamental principles of our free institutions,
as well as the general principles of political philosophy. I would
refer to those opinions as containing the discussion and illustration
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of many points applicable to this case, which from the fact that they
are there so fully discussed, I have not deemed it necessary to notice here.
It is claimed that the Legislature had by subsequent legislation, ratified this Act before the commencement of this suit. If
this Act at the time it was passed was void, for the reason that it
did not contain an expression of the legislative will upon the subject matter of the Act, I do not perceive how an amendment of
the Act, unless made upon some point necessarily requiring the expression of the legislative will upon the expediency of the Act
itself, can be held to ratify it.
The Legislature in passing the Act with a provision to submit the
question to a vote of the people, assumed that the Legislature as
well as the people were vested with a power which we hold they do
not possess. In amending the Act we have -the right to suppose
that they still labored under the same impression.
They therefore only intended to amend what they supposed- to be
a valid law of the land, and not to take the responsibility of re-enacting the law itself. An amendment made under such circumstances cannot have the effect to make a void law valid.
. And as to the subsequent Act, the title of which reads, "An Act
to submit to the people at the next annual election the question of
the repeal of the Act establishing Free Schools throughout the
State," it is so palpably unconstitutional even within the reasoning
of my brother Johfison, in Johnson vs. Rich, cited above, that it will
scarcely be claimed it could have any ratifying effect upon another
unconstitutional law.
The Judgment at the Special Term must, therefore, be affirmed.

In the Supreme Court of New Jersey, February, 1853.
DACOSTA & DAVIS, vs. DAVIS & HATCH.
A contract for the sale of personal chattels over the value of $30, made in New
Jersey, but to be performed in Pennsylvania, must, in order to be binding, be
made according to the formalities prescribed by tbe statute of New Jersey, for the
prevention of frauds and perjuries.
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This case arose on Certificate from the Circuit Court of Camden,
for an advisary opinion.
Browning for Plaintiffs.
.Dudley and Carpenterfor Defendants.

The opinion of the Court was delivered by
J.-The point presented is, whether the statute of frauds in
New Jersey, prescribes the proof necessary to establish the contract
set up by the plaintiffs, which was to be performed in Pennsylvania.
In the fifteenth section of the act ior the prevention of frauds
and perjuries, (Revised Statutes, page 504,) it is enacted, that
"no contract for the sale of any goods, wares and merchandise, for
the price of thirty dollars or upwards, shall be allowed to be good,
except the buyer shall accept a part of the goods so sold, and actually receive the same, or give something in earnest to bind the
bargain, or in part of payment, or that some note or memorandum
in writing of the said bargain, be made and signed by the parties,
to be charged by such contract, or their agents, thereunto lawfully
.authorized."
In the State of Pennsylvania there is no such statute; and the
ground taken by the plaintiffs is, that as the subject-matter of the
sale was in Philadelphia, and the delivery and payment were to be
made there, the place of performance was fixed in Pennsylvania;
and that proof, according to the laws of that State, should be held
sufficient to establish the contract.
Whatever may be the rule governing contracts made in one
State, respecting immoveable property in another State, when the
laws of the two require different solemnities to give validity to sales
thereof, or contracts made in one State, and consummated and recognized by delivery and enjoyment of the subject-matter of it in
another State, having different laws as to tests of validity of sales,
it is clear that personal property or merchandise has no locua site,
but follows the person of the owner; and the generally recognized
rule is, that his alienation of it is governed by the law of the domioil, or of the place where the sale is made. Such contracts should
have in any other State, the same interpretations, binding force and
validity, which they have in the State where made. The lex loci
OGDEN,
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contractu8 acts upon the right8 of the parties, though the remedy
may be otherwise controlled. Had the turpentine in question been
stored in Camden, and the agreement of the parties have been that
it should be delivered there, the laws of New Jersey admittedly
would have governed in deciding upon the validity or invalidity of
the contract for the sale, even if the suit had been brought in
another State. If the contract for the sale was good in New
Jersey, it would have been good in Pennsylvania; and it is a consequence, that if void in New Jersey, it must be void in Pennsylvania,
and every where else. It would be doing violence to well-established principles in jurisprudence, to hold that a contract respecting
chattels, void for want of proper authenticity in the place where
made, should be valid, under any circumstances, within other territorial limits.
Admitting the ground taken by the plaintiffs, that the lex loci
contractus is, in some measure, affected by the law of the place
where the contract is to be performed, the principle of that rule
does not apply to the point in the present case. It may relate tQ
the rate of interest recoverable upon a class of such contracts, but
not to the essence and vitality of the qontracts.themselves.
Burge on Suretie8, p. 100. " Whatever formality or ceremony,
either as to time, place or manner of making the contract, or as to
its form, as whether by parol or in writing, which the law renders
essential to the perfection and validity of the contract, and is required to be observed as a condition on which it recognizes the
existence of the contract, is one of the solemnia of it." And "the
manner in which a contract is constituted, is one of the solemnia of
the contract, and its validity depends upon the lex loci contractus."
Hartin's Louisiana Reports, p. 84. "Contracts are governed
by the law of the country in which they are made, in everything
which relates to the mode of construing them, the meaning to be
attached to the expressions used, and the nature and validity of the
engagement.
The law of the place where a contract is entered into, is to govern
as to everything which concerns the proof and 'authenticity of the
contract, and the faith which is due to it; that is to say, in all
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Cited from a
things -which regard its solemnities and formalities.
foreign jurist in Story on Conflict of Laws, section 240. "The
performance is to be according to the law of the country where it
is to take place."
In a case where a contract was made in one country for the payment of money in another country, where, by a law, a stamp was
required to make the contract valid, but not so where the contract
was made, it was held that in such a case a stamp was not necessary
to give validity to the contract; that it being valid where made, it
was valid elsewhere; and that the lex loci contractus, and not the
The Court remarked,
lex solutionis, should control the question.
"that an instrument, as to its form and the formalities attending
its execution, must be tested by the laws of the place where it is
made; but the laws and usages of the place where the obligation,
of which it is evidence, is to be fulfilled, must regulate the performance." The rule is clear, that if the parties mean to bind themselves,
they will adopt the forms and solemnities which the lex loci preThey are the
scribes for establishing the validity of a contract.
only criteriafor testing the intention of parties.
A clearer illustration of the rule is drawn from a particular consideration of the effect of the foregoing provision of the statute of
frauds upon contracts, to which it refers. Story on Conflict of
Laws, section 282, says, "if such contracts made by parol (per
verba,) in a country, by whose laws they are required to be in
writing, are sought to be enforced in any other country, they will
be held void, exactly as they are held void in the place where they
are made."
Upon the foregoing well-established rules and principles, it is
evident that if the turpentine had been lying in Camden insteadpf
Philadelphia, and was to have been there delivered, no action could
have been maintained on the proof relied upon by these plaintiffs,
either in the tribunals of New Jersey or of Pennsylvania.
How does the fact of the storage of the article, and the allegation that it was to be delivered and paid for in Philadelphia, bear
upon the validity of the contract of the sale ? Or affect any of the
"1solemnia" which manifest its legal existence ? That question I
have not been able to solve favorably for the plaintiffs.
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By the law applicable to the case, the Circuit Court should not
have admitted oral testimony to prove the contract declared upon,
but under the circumstances, it should have required the production of a writing, made in conformity with the provisions of the
Upon
statute of New Jersey to prevent frauds and perjuries.
this point, then, the Court should be advised that the verdict
must be set aside, and the plaintiffs non-suited.

In the Supreme Court of .Pennsylvania.
MILLER VS.

GILLELAND.

1. Where the holder of a bond or note makes an alteration in its date, he avoids the
instrument, even though the alteration was in truth the correction of a mistake,
and was so intended.-Lownin and WOODWAUD, J. J. disenting.
2. The original action here was upon a note under seal The plaintiff alleged that
the note was dated as of a wrong year, and altered it for the purpose of making
it conform to the truth. On the trial it was objected, that the note was avoided
by the alteration, and thereupon the plaintiff proved that the alteration was
honestly made in mere correction of a mistake, and under the instruction of the
Court, (WATTS, P. J.) that this was a sufficient answer to the objection, the plaintiff
had a verdict, and judgment was entered thereon. To this instruction the error is
assigned.

The opinion of the Court was delivered by
GIBSON, J.-The conveyance of an estate which lies in livery and
not in grant, is not avoided by an alteration even in a material part of
it: for the title, being vested by a deed having by statute the force of
livery of seisin, can be revested only by a reconveyance. (Bull, .P.
217.) But an alteration of a bond, bill or note, stands on a different
principle. Where.it is made by the voluntary act of the creditor and
increases or injuriously affects the responsibility of the debtor, what
ever the motive for it, the security is gone. The rule is founded in
policy to protect the debtor from acts prejudicial to him, hard to be
guarded against, and done in his absence, and without his agency or
consent; but it is unapplicable to an alteration which leaves the
legal effect of the instrument as it was before, is was held in Zoucke
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vs. Clay, 1 Vent. 185; H!unt vs. Adams, 6 Mass. 519, Nevins vs. Do
Grand, 15 Mass. 436, and some other cases. Where there can be
no wrong, the policy of protection has no place. But ift no other
case can the bona fides of an unauthorized alteration of a security
in the hands of the holder, purge it of its ostensible impurity.
There is a class of cases apparently inconsistent with the rule
just indicated, but not actually so. in those an interlineation or an
erasure has been explained by showing it to have been made before
the bill had been accepted or the note negotiated; or that it had
received the assent of the parties interested; but in this respect it
has received no more indulgence than an erasure or alteration of a
deed before delivery. Of this class are Henman vs. Diccenson, 5
.Bingh, 183, Knight vs. Clements, 8 Adolph and El. 221, Bishop
vs. Chambre, 3 0. and P. 53. Cliford vs. Parker, 2 Mann and
Grang, 910, and Oariss vs. Tartersall, id. 890. In England there
is still another class aecided on the stamp acts, which furnishes no
rule for the protection of the debtor. The question had regard to
the protection of the revenue; and parol evidence was received to
show that an alteration of a date was not made to save the expense of a new stamp. Of this class is _Iershaw vs. Cox, 3 Esp.
N. P. C. 246, and others which might be quoted.
On the subject of alteration in the body of a note, the cases are
harmonious, but on the subject of adding to the evidence of attestation they are not entirely so. In Adams vs. .Frye, 3 Met. 103, it
was said that if an obligee fraudulently procure a person who was
not present at the execution to subscribe as a witness, he destroys
his security; but it was further said that this consequence may be
avoided by proving the act to have been done honestly. And this
for two reasons, that as the bond is complete without a subscribing
witness, the obligee cannot be harmed by putting a name to it which
is merely surplusage, but that if the name be put to it with a foul
design, the obligee should be punished for his turpitude. The first
of these is evidently fallacious, for proof of the hand writing of the
supposititious witness, would in the event of his death or absence be
prima facie evidence of execution; and in that aspect, the obligee
might be as much injured by an alteration in the clause of attesta43

RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.

tion as by an alteration in the body of the bond; and the second is
equally so; for if loss of the security be a penalty for an abortive
attempt at fraud, it ought to be inflicted for a bungling attempt to
alter the effect of the instrument which failed only for want of capacity to accomplish it. But whatever be the decision in Adams vs.
Frye, it is enough for the occasion that the point was ruled differently in Marshallvs. Goughler, 10 S. and R. 164, which furnishes
a precedent that we are bound to follow.
On the abstract principle all our own decisions are to the same
effect, and they stand as clear on principle as they do on precedent.
The law no more abhors parol evidence to explain the words of a
written contract than it abhors it to show what were the words
themselves when the contract was executed. The danger from it
in either way is the same. A chancellor, in the exercise of his extraordinary discretion doubtless receives it to reform an instrument,
but cautiously, and only in clear cases of accident, omission or mistake, and where the conduct of the party seeking relief is above
suspicion. But to tolerate an attempt to reform a security by the
rash, and it may be a secret act of the creditor, would change the
position of the debtor, and subject him to risk and trouble which
ought not to be imposed on him.
It would compel him to encounter the perils of parol pioof, not only
to establish the fact of alteration, but to show what the instrument
originally was; and that done, to meet the creditor's proof of bona
fides. Ought a faultless party to be involved in such a contest out
of tenderness to an ignorant and presumptuous creditor; or be exposed to the untruthfulness of witnesses, or the misconceptions of
jurors? It is a familiar principle that a particular hardship'shall
be borne by him whose act was the cause of it.
The alteration of the date in this instance did not retard the day
of payment, and consequently did not discharge the defendant as a
surety by giving time to the principal; but it is not easy to imagine
how an alteration of the date of a security for money may not be
detrimental to the debtor. If the day of payment be accelerated
by it the debtor loses a part of the time for which he stipulated,
and the computation of interest is affected by it. If it be retarded,
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the starting of the statute of limitations, on the presumption of
payment from lapse of time, is also retarded by it; and such alterations have been made to evade the one or the other. As the plaintiff in this case brought suit within six years of the true date, the
defendant could not be prejudiced in that respect further than the
risk and expense incurred in showing the truth-which is clearly
a substantive injury to him-but the injury has regard to the possible effect of the alteraton when it was made, and not to its present
effect as things have turned up. If the note was avoided by it, and
no one can doubt it, it is still void; and so the jury ought to have
been directed.
Judgment reversed.
Justice LowRIEi dissented and delivered the following opinion,
Justice WOODWARD concurring therein.
Fleming Gilleland held the joint and several note of Witherow
and Miller under seal, on which Miller was in fact surety, for the
sum of $322,56, and dated September 24th, 1836. In 1839 or
1840, and after the note had become due, Gilleland, in the presence
of Miller, spoke about there being an error in the date of the note,
and there was some conversation between the witness, Gilleland, and
Miller about it. Miller said he knew nothing about it and could say
nothing. Yet Gilleland then and there got the witness to make the
alteration of the date from 1836 to 1838. Under the instructions
of the Court the jury have found that the true date of the transaction was 1838, and that the alteration was the correction of a mistake. Does this fact justify the alteration ? Does the alteration
of an instrument by the holder of it, honestly made for the mere
purpose of correcting a mistake, vitiate it? This is the question of
the cause.
In considering this question we set aside the relation of Miller
as surety; because he was not affected by the alteration of the date
to what in truth it should have been: for the truth wrongs no man.
We set aside also the old rule that every material alteration avoided
the instrument, because it could no longer be alleged or proved
as the very agreement of the parties-a rule that applied to accidental and honest, as well as to fraudulent alterations, but which
has long since ceased with the reason of it.
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Now it is said that every material alteration of a contract by one
of the parties, makes it void in his hands, because it is against public policy to allow any tampering with written instruments.
And why must the alteration be a material one? Under the old
rule, immaterial alterations were disregarded, because they occasioned no variance between the allegations and the proof; bit
this reasoning will not do under a rule to prevent tampering with
with written instruments.
It will not do to say that they do no wrong: for neither does an
alteration that accords with the truth do wrong. It is not sufficient
to answer that it improperly compels the other party to encounter the
perils of parol proof as to a written contract: for even immaterial
alterations do this, when there is an erasure or mutilation, which
cannot be ascertained to be immaterial without resorting to parol
proof as to the original state of the instrument. 10 Shepley' 829.
But it is not the act of one party, the correction, that opens the door
to parol evidence. That is already open in all cases where fraud
or mistake is alleged. When the parties made this mutual mistake
in the date, or alleged it, they had a right to parol proof to ascertain and correct it.
If by material alteration, one is meant which materially changes
the true contract of the parties, then we escape these difficulties and
we discover harmony in the principles usually announced on the
subject. Then an immaterial alteration does not vitiate the instrument, because it does not change the true rights of the parties ; it
does no wrong to either. If it be a correction, it is doing what the
law would do; and from all this no fraudulent intention can be inferred. But a material alteration is totally different, and it avoids
the contract, because fraud is necessarily inferred. And then the
rule applies that the law helps no man out of a position into wLich
he has fraudulently placed himself.
Whence, then, comes the rule of policy that punishes a man so
severely for an act that is true and honest though unwise? It is
natural to look to the laws concerning forgery, their express purpose being in fact to prevent all tampering with written contracts.
But we do not find it here: for their policy is to prevent "fraudu-
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lent" alterations "to the prejudice of another man's rights." They
punish for crimes, not indiscretions. But the policy of the rule now
contended for does not thus discriminate. Its punishments are not
at all proportioned to the offence; for its inflicts the same penalty
where a dishonest intent does not, as where it does appear. Besides this, its mode of punishment is by taking the money of an
honest man and giving it, not to the State whose policy has been
violated, but to another man who has no merit, and who has not been
wronged, and whose defence cannot be honest if the alteration be
the correction of a mistake.
If this policy cannot be founded upon well established principles
and justified by them, then it is arbitrary in its character and the
Court has no right to declare it. It is not common law, for it
shocks, instead of according with the common sense and general
customs of the people. It is an attempt to found a practice, rather
than to enforce a principle. It is not the duty nor the right of Courts
to teach people what is duty by establishing new rules? but to ascertain and declare, and apply those already existing. They teach
law in administering it, but administration only is their duty. If
we declare that a fraudulent alteration vitiates, we logically apply
the ordinary rule that fraud vitiates every contract that it taints.'
And there is great merit in this rule, for common honesty suggests it, it requires no arbitrary teaching, and no honest man can
ever be entrapped by it. The law is and ought to be strict in dealing with fraud; but it cannot and ought not to be strict in dealing
with acts that are merely unwise, or that display want of care or
skill. Hence a very impbrtant branch of the law is designed to
relieve the people from mistakes, so far as this can be done without
prejudice to others, and in Jeremy's -Eq. Jur. 358, mistake is defined as the "reiult of ignorance of law or fact, which has misled a
person to commit that which, if h had not been in error, he would
not have done ;" a definition that includes an act done as this was.
The law would be most grievously defective, if it visited the loss
of rights upon acts or omissions in which there is no moral turpitude,
unless in cases'where there is very great risk in affording a remedy.
Where it is clearly proved that a written contract has been mutila-
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ted, altered or destroyed, or lost by accident or mistake, or by the
act of a stranger, the Courts do not hesitate to admit parol evidence. 8 Watts, 448. Yet in almost all such cases, the necessity
arises from the carelessness of the party offering the evidence.
Let those who would refuse a remedy in the present case draw any
clear and satisfactory distinction, in degree, between the fault of
omission there and the fault of commission here.
Where, then, do we find the principles or analogies on which the
alleged policy is founded? It is not in that rule that declares all
contracts void, the subject matter of which is morally or legally
wrong; for the principle there is totally different. It is not, except as a mere legal suspicion, in those cases where a man obtains
a contract by taking an undue advantage of his own position or of
the position of the other party; for in these cases the party does
not lose his rights, but the Courts relieve the injured, by doing justice to both.
We might expect to find the policy in the cases arising under the
English Stamp Act, but we do not. Such is the exceeding proneness of men to defraud the government of its taxes that the Courts
are compelled to be exceedingly suspicious of all altered instruments; and this expresses the policy and the reason of it. It relates
to transactions inwhich the government on one side and the contracting parties on the other, are the parties. By an alteration, a new
agreement may be made on a stamp already once used, and it might
be policy to require the parties to get a new stamp rather than
allow them to make an alteration, and to declare the agreement
void for want of it. But such is not the case. Even the use of
an improper stamp may be corrected by a new one, and if there is
a mistake in the agreement, it may be corrected even after delvery,
if the parties can prove that the alteration was the correction of an
original mistake. Then the alteration is no injury to the government and the danger of frauds is not considered a sufficient reason
for excluding the evidence. Here then is a policy of extreme suspicion, in order to protect the taxing power against the frauds of
the tax payer. But it is a suspicion that charges fraud and allows
its disproval; not one that condemns without a hearing. 10 East.
431. 12 id. 471. 15 id. 412. 14 Mees. & W. 873.
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Thus far we have endeavored to show that there is no proper
foundation for the rule of policy contended for; and now we shall
show by direct evidence that it does not exist. Mr. Greenleaf in his
Evidence, Sect. 564, considers the true rule to be that even material
alterations do not vitiate, if they appear to have been made with an
honest intention, and such is clearly announced as the law in
GraniteRailway Co. vs. Bacon, 15 Pick, 239. Beaman vs. Russel,
20 Verm. 205. Bliss vs. Mcntire, 18 id. 466. Mfontgomery B?. B.
vs. Hurst, 9 Ala. R. 513.
And more directly to the purpose, it has often been said and decided that an alteration by one party, to make the instrument conform to the original intention of the parties, does not vitiate. Hervey vs. Hfervey, 3 Shepl. 357. People vs. Muzzy, 1 Denio, 239.
Boyd vs. Brotherson, 10 Wend. 93. Hatch vs. Hatch, 9 Mass.
307. ifamelin vs. Bruck, 9 Queen's B. R. 306. Tubb vs. Hadding, Minor's Rep. 129.
In many other cases the instinct of common sense has led the
courts to assume that a fraudulent intention is a necessary part of
the act that vitiates, even when they have not had leisure to attempt a logical analysis, or definition of the rule. 1 Greenl. 73.
8 Cow. 75. 4 T. R. 329. 1 Shepl. 386. 15 East. 29. 11 Mees.
& W. 465. 2 Mason, 478. 2 Wash. 218. 2 N. Hamp. 543. 11
Conn. 531. 10 id. 197. 2 Barb. C. R. 12, 8 Ad. & El. 136.
In Hale vs. Russ, I Greenl. 334, the name of the obligee was
changed, and in Ogle vs. Graham, 2 Penna. R. 132, the amount
was reduced, without the consent of sureties; and it was held that,
as there was no fraudulent intent, the consent of the sureties would
be presumed. And so in other cases where another promisor is
added. 6 Alab. 513. 8 Dana, 98. In Bowers vs. Jewell, 2 N.
Hamp. 548, Mr. Justice Woodbury says, "the alteration must be
done -ith an eye to gain an advantage, and that cannot be the case
if the alteration makes the sum less, or gives a longer time for payment, and whether it is fraudulent or not should be submitted to
the jury." In Prevost vs. Gra'tz, 6 Wheat. 502, an alteration by
the holder is sustained on the ground that it must have been honestly done. And in Whiting vs. Daniel, I Hen. & M. 391, the fill-
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ing up of a date without fraud was held not to vitiate. In Neven8
vs. De Grand, 15 Mass. 436, a special endorsement was stricken out
"with honest intentions," and was allowed to be restored. 10 Eng.
C. L. R. 140. 2 id. 176. 3 T. R. 153 n.
Though the improper addition of a subscribing witness is material, yet it has often been held that, if it appear to have been done
without any intention to defraud, it does not vitiate. Beasy vs.
Ilaines, 4 Whart. 17. Foust vs. Benno, 8 State R. 378. Thornton
vs. Appleton, 29 Maine R. 298. Ford vs. -Ford,17 Pick. 418.
Smith vs. Dunham, 8 id. 249. Adams vs. Frye, 3 Met. 103. And
such is the very point, and the only relevant one, decided in our
case of Marshall vs. Gouglder, 10 S. & R. 164. Without attempting to reconcile the learned judge's reasoning in this case with his
conclusion, we may account for it by observing that he had not got
his mind free from the ancient rule which regarded the matter as a
question of pleading, and not one as to the relations of the parties.
On the same day with this last case, the same learned judge gave
the opinion in Stahl vs. .Berger,ibid. 170, wherein the filling up of a
blank according to the original intention of the obligor was held not
to vitiate; and he declares as to alterations that "the true ground
seems to be that it should be in fraud of the party interested."
Nor can any one read his opinions in Babb vs. Clemson, ibid. 424,
and Heffefinger vs. Shutz, 16 S.& R. 44, without observing that
the same principle is assumed. Hudson vs. Beel, 5 State R. 279,
was a case of apparent mutilation, and it was left to the jury to
say "whether there had been any tampering with or alteration of
the writing with a view to deprive the defendant of any legal advantage"-and this was held, in this court to be correct. In Arrison vs. farmstead, 2 State R. 194, Mr. Justice Rogers assumes
that it must be a "fraudulent alteration" as well as subsequent, in
order to. vitiate.
But by admitting oral testimony to sustain even an honest correction made by one party, do-we not leave a door open for fraudulent alterations ? Let it be admitted that we do. There is still
very great value in written contracts, for they do most efficiently reduce the chances of disputes; because an agreement to be written
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must be first well defined, and when it is written, the writing corrects
the inaccuracies of the memory. But it cannot exclude oral testimony, for this must be admitted, at least to show performance, satisfaction or payment, in discharge of the contract; and here fraud
may be practised. The law does not expect ever to exclude frauds
entirely. Before it can succeed in doing so, it must repress all business and all freedom of action. We cannot by legislation make
people either accurate or honest.* Even a written contract may be
tainted with fraud and that must be exposed. It may contain an
error or omission, and that must be proved. If we refuse either,
we encourage fraud. If we allow either, we open a door by which
fraud may enter in the very face of the Court and by its aid.
What shall we do ? The law in its wise experience declares, that
by refusing to hear evidence of fraud and mistake against a written
contract, there is more encouragement given to fraud than by receiving it; for dishonest men alone commit frauds and refuse the
correction of mistakes; and frauds are much more apt to be
committed against confiding honesty, in a privhte transaction, than
against the awakened suspicion of a judical tribunal.
Here a mistake is alleged and corrected by the plaintiff, and the
true question is, has the mistake been proved and the correction
rightly made ? and the jury'have answered that it has. The plaintiff gained nothing by making the correction himself, and did not
seek to. It was indiscreet in him to make the correction, but he
did no wrong by it, and should not suffer for it.
For these reasons we think that this judgment should be affirmed.
Judgment reversed.

In the Court of Common Pleas of Perry County, Pennsylvania.
CASSEL vz. HERRON & PATTERSON.
1. The concealment of a known defect in a horse, not within the reach of observation
by the vendee, and not made known to him at the sale, such as glanders, which,
by reason of powders administered by the vendor, had assumed a latent form,
will avoid the contract.

RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.
2. Where a promissory note had been given for the purchase money, for a diseased
and worthless mare, the conduct of the holder of the note having misled the buyer
into the purchase, held, that the consideration had failed, and ;no recovery could
be had on the note.

This was an action of debt, founded upon a promissory note.
The defendants alleged a failure of the consideration. The case
was tried, and verdict rendered for defendants, and the following
opinion, in which the facts of the cause are sufficiently stated for a
proper understanding of it, delivered on a motion for a new trial
made by the plaintiff.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
GRAHAM), P. J.-The plaintiff asks for a new trial on the ground
of misdirection by the Court in instructing the jury, that if they
believed that at the time of the purchase of the mare, which was
the consideration of the note on which the suit was brought, she
was diseased and of no value, which was known to the plaintiff,
that the fact was not made known by Cassel to the defendants, and
that the diseased condition of the mare could not be discovered at
the time of the purchase, then their verdict should be for the defendants.
The evidence in this case shows that the mare was glandered, a
disease the witnesses considered incurable, and all the witnesses,
examined on that point, concurred in saying that she was of no
value. It was further proved, that when the mare was permitted
to rest for some time without labor, and powders were administered
by Cassel, the disease assumed a latent form, not discoverable.
The question then'presented is, will the concealment of a known
defect, not within the reach of the observation of one of the contracting parties, avoid the contract.
Although it is said by legal commentators, "1that human laws
are not so perfect as the dictates of conscience, and the sphere of
morality is more enlarged than the limits of civil jurisdiction," and
Pothier considers some of the rules of morality laid down by Cicero,
"9as being of too severe anxl elevated a character for practical application, or the cognizance of human tribunals." Yet we are pleased
to discover, on a reference to the law applicable to this case, that
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the immorality of this transaction is not of so refined and elevated
a character as to soar above "the cognizance of human tribunals.'"
A fraud may be perpetrated, which will vitiate a contract, as well
by a suppressio veri, as by an expressio falsi. "Fraudulent representation, or concealment of material circumstances, vitiates all
contracts." 1 Comyn on Contracts, 85.
"Fraud more clearly occurs, where one person substantially misrepresents or conceals a material fact precisely within his own
knowledge, in consequence of which a delusion exists; or uses a
device naturally calculated to lull the suspicions of a careful man,
and induce him to forego inquiry into a matter upon which the other
party has information, although such information be not exclusively
within his reach." Chit. on Con. 7th American Ed. 681-2.
" In England, the buyer is his own merchant, and has no implied
warranty to rely on, unless there be a distinct usage in the trade,
or a latent fault known to the seller, and fraudulently concealed,
or the condition of the thing misrepresented." Bell's Contract of
Sale, 161-50 Law Lib.
"If there be an intentional concealment or suppression of material facts in making a contract, in cases in which both parties have
not equal access to the means of information, it will be deemed
unfair dealing, and will vitiate and avoid the contract. 2 Kent's
Corn. 482.
The same commentator, with his usual clearness and precision of
language, thus states the rule on page 485. " The common law
affords to every one reasonable protection against fraud in dealing;
but it does not go to the romantic length of giving indemnity
against-the consequences of indolence and folly, or a careless indifference to the ordinary and accessible means of information. It
reconciles the claims of convenience, with the duties of good faith,
to every extent compatible with the interests of commerce. This
it does by requiring the purchaser to apply his attention to those
particulars, which may be supposed within the reach of his observation and judgment; and the vendor to communicate those particulars and defects, which cannot be supposed to be immediately within
the reach of such attention. If the purchaser be wanting of atten-

684
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tion to these points, where attention would be sufficient to protect
him from surprise or imposition, the maxim caveat emptor ought to
apply." "And if the vendor be wanting in good faith, fides servanda is a rule equally enforced at law and in equity."
Thus we find the law in the different text writers to which we
have referred, which has been adopted by our Courts generally in
the different states.
In JDixon vs. MeClutchay, Addison Reports, 323, the Court say:
"A man who sells a horse to another, knowing a material defect,
vhich, in equity and good conscience, he ought to disclose, and does
not; if it be not known to the buyer, or such as a buyer of common
prudence must be presumed to know; this is such a fraud as vitiates
the contract, and the buyer may call for his money again."
In .Kimmel vs. Lichty, 3 Yeates, 262, the Court stated the law
to be: "If one sells an unsound horse knowingly, and conceals the
circumstances, and receives a sound price, he is answerable in damages for the deceit."
In
JeDowell vs. Burd, 6 Binney, 198, the, sale of a negro
slave, even without warranty, knowing that he was affected with a
disease which greatly injured him, and concealing that circumstance
from the purchaser, was adjudged a good defence to an action
brought to recover the price.
In Light vs. Stoever's Exr. 12 S. & R. 432, in action on a
bond given for the purchase of a mill and farm, defendant was permitted to prove that the dam caused the water to overflow the lands
of another, which was known to plaintiff, and concealed from defendant, and therefore it would be against equity to insist on the
payment of the whole of the purchase-money.
The same principle is recognized in the recent 6ase of Price vs.
Lewis, 5 Harris, 51 and 54. That the misconduct of the plaintiff,
in the willful suppression of a material fact, known only to him,
furnished an equitable defence.
So also are the decisions of the Courts in New York and Massachusetts. See Fleming vs. Socum, 18 Johnson Rep. 403; Allen
vs. Addington, 7 Wendell, 9; Bliss vs. Thompson, 4 Mass. R. 491.
The case of McFarlandvs. Newman, 9 Watts, 55, relied upon
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by plaintiff's counsel, was an action of assumpsit upon an alleged
warranty, in which the Court held, that the naked averment of a
fact, is neither a warranty, nor the evidence of it, and the plaintiff's'
remedy was an action for the deceit.
The motion for a new trial is over-ruled, and judgment directed
to be entered on the verdict by the Court.

In the Court of Common -Pleasof Olejo, Hay Term, 1853.
BOWEN & MC.NAMEE,

vs. THE LAKE ERIE TELEGRAPH COMPANY.

Telegraph Companies holding themselves out to transmit despatches correctly, are
bound so to do, or respond in damages, unless the causes of failure are beyond

their control.

This was an action brought by the plaintiffs, to recover of the
defendant, damages sustained by reason of a mistake in the transmission of a telegrapic despatch sent over the line of the defendants, from Monroe, Michigan, to Buffalo, New York, Nov. 25th,
1850. The -despatchwas as follows:
"Send one handsome eight dollar blue and orange, and twentyfour red and green, three twenty-fives, Bay State. Fill former
orders with best high colors you can."
(Signed,)
Bidwell & Co., Adrian, Michigan.
To Bowen & McNamee, New York.

The proof was that the despatch, when it reached. New York,
read "one hundred," instead of "one handsome," and that the
mistake complained of occurred in some office upon the defendants'
line. That the plaintiffs, after having had the despatch repeated,
(how far back did not appear,) and receiving it a second time, "one
hundred,', shipped to Bidwell & Co., -" one hundred eight dollar
blue and orange Bay State" shawls ; that the shawls were returned,
and reached New York after the shawl season had closed; by
reason of which, they were depreciated in value.
The plaintiffs claimed to recover charges for freight and the depreciation in value.
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The defandants denied the commission of the error, and claimed
that the despatch was so obscure as to be inappreciable, and not,
therefore, the subject matter of damages, even if the error had
been made; that Telegraph Companies were not held to the same
accountability as common carriers, and that such errors as the one
complained of, might occur without gross negligence.
The cause was argued to the jury by Win. Slade, Jr., -Esq., for
the plaintiffs, and John A. Toot, -Esq., for defendants.
-His Honor, JUDGE STARKWEATHER, charged in substance, that
Telegraph Companies holding 'themselves out to transmit despatches
correctly, were under obligation so to do, unless prevented by causes
over which they had no control; that the defendant was bound to
send the message in question, correctly. and that if it failed in this
duty, whereby damage had occurred to the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs
must recover. That if the message was originally so obscure as to
be inappreciable, that then the error complained of could not have
increased its obscurity, and the plaintiffs could not recover; but if it
was sufficiently plain to be understood by Bowen & McNamee, the
plaintiffs in this case, the merchants to whom it was addressed,
though not intelligible to others, that it was appreciable, and if
changed to the injury of the plaintiffs, such a change wgs a proper
subject of damages.
All these questions under the charge of the Court, were for the
jury upon the evidence in the case.
The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiffs, for one hundred
and eighteen dollars damages.
In the Supreme 0ourt of Kentucky.
HOWARD

vS.

THE KENTUCKY

AND

LOUISVILLE MUTUAL

INSURANCE

COMPANY.

1. IL effected an insurance upon a certain building, partly frame and partly brick;
subsequent to the insurance, and without notice to the Insurance Company, H.
erected a frame building contiguous to the one insured, which latter building took
fire, and caused the former to burn. Hdd, that H. could not recover, because the
erection of the frame building was a breach of good faith, and the loss was caused
by his own misconduct.
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2. Hed, That had the building insured been burned without the occasion of its
destruction, being the frame, he might recover, because no actual injury had
thence arisen.

Howard brought an action in the Bourbon Circuit .Court, against
the Kentucky and Louisville Mutual Insurance Company, and
stated in his petition that the defendants by their policy, dated 4th
of January, 1848, agreed to pay him the sum of two thousand
dollars, if his three story brick and frame warehouse, situated in
the town of Paris, should be destroyed by fire within six years
from the date of the policy; that he had duly performed all the
conditions required of him by the policy, and that on the
day of
, 1851, the frame part of said warehouse was
entirely, and the brick portion partially destroyed by fire, the policy
still being in full force, and the building occupied as at the date
thereof; and that the defendants had not, although duly notified
of this -fact in the manner required by the policy, rebuilt said warehouse, or paid him the amount of the insurance. He therefore
prayed judgment for the two thousand dollars.
The defendants stated in their answer, that the loss mentioned in
the petition was occasioned by the burning of a frame building
erected by the plaintiff since the date of the policy, near to the
house insured, without the knowledge or consent of the defendants,
and that the risk was much increased, and the loss iD fact, directly
occasioned thereby.
In determining the validity of this defence, the Court per
SImPSON, J., delivered the following opinion:
In the description of the building insured, made by the plaintiff
at the time .he procured the policy, he was required to state its
relative situation to other buildings, and distance from each, if less
than .ten rods, and the purposes for which such other buildings were
occupied. It thus appears that these matters entered into the esti-,
mate of the risk, and therefore the applicant was under an obligation to give a true statement of them in the description he furnished. But he did not undertake, either expressly or by implication, that the relative situation of the building insured, to other
adjcent buildings, should remain unchanged during the continu-
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* ance of the policy. He was not required to state in the description of the property insured, who were the proprietors of the
adjacent vacant ground upon which other buildings might be
erected, and if it belonged to other persons, it could not have been
contemplated by the parties, that he should be responsible for their
acts.
The policy contains no prohibition against the erection of other
buildings contiguous to those insured. The defendants, by the
terms of the policy, guarded against an increase of the risk, by an
appropriation of the building insured, for a purpose more hazardous
than that'which existed at its date, %bydeclaring the policy void in
consequence of such increased risk; but they did not insert any
such stipulation with respect to the erection of contiguous buildings.
The mere erection of an adjacent building by the assured, did
not therefore render the policy void, or discharge the underwriters.
It might not have produced any actual injury to the insurers, even
if it greatly increased the risk, and as the act did not violate any
express stipulation in the policy, the law would, in the event that
no injury actually resulted from it, regard it as harmless and unimportant. Although, however, the policy was not rendered void
by ihe subsequent erection of a building contiguous to those
insured, it does not follow that the insurers are bound to sustain
the loss, if one occurred, and was occasioned by such an act on the
part of the assured. The contract of insurance rests upon the
mutual good faith of the parties. The assured violates this good
faith, by doing any act -which increases the risk that has been incurred by the insurers. Such a breach of good faith, if it produce
no injury to the other party, does not impair the rights of the
assured under the contract, but if it occasion a loss, such loss devolves upon him, and not upon the insurers, inasmuch as it results'
from a violation of that good faith which in legal contemplation
was pledged to them, that the risk should not be increased by his act
during the continuance of the policy, without their assent. Hence,
if the assured should, subsequcnt to the date of the policy, erect a
building contiguous to the property insured, and thereby greatly
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increase the hazard of loss by fire, and a loss should occur, which
was not occasioned by the building newly erected, the insurers
would have no cause to, complain of the act of the assured, but
ought in justice to make good the loss. But if this act of the
assured was the cause of the loss, and in reality produced it, then
as it resulted from his own unauthorized act, involving a breach of
those obligations which the observance of good faith imposed upon
him, the insurers should not in justice be liable for it, nor would the
law impose any obligation upon them to indemnify the assured for
a loss which was evidently occasioned by his own misconduct.
(Stebbens vs. Globe Insurance Company, 2 Hall's Rep. 632. 2
Phillips on Insurance, 177.)
Tested by these principles, the defence contained in the answer,
if the facts therein stated are true, is sufficient to defeat the plaintiff's action.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia.
WILLIAM DOUGHERTY2 PLAINTIFF IN ERROR) VS. THE WESTERN BANK
OF GEORGIA.
1. In an action on a bank note against the bank which issued it, payable generally
on demand, it is not necessary to aver and prove a demand, the suit itself being a
sufficient demand.
2. In a case, however, of a bank note payable on demand at a particular place, held,
- that a demand at the place is necessary to a suit against the bank at the time
designated, or afterwards, (if time is also specified,) and must be averred in the
declaration, and proven on the trial; and that the place must be stated in the
note with distinctness and precision.
3. Hfeld, That the statute of limitations does not apply to bank bills in favor of the
bank.

The opinion of the Court, of which we print all that is important, was delivered by
NISBET, J.-Our next inquiry is this, is the rule thus declared,
applicable to bank bills? We think that the rule of the commercial law, applicable to a private note, or to a bill of exchange payable
44
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generally on demand, is applicable to a bank bill, payable generally
on demand, and that is, that averment and proof of demand are not
necessary in order to charge the bank which i88ue8 it. The suit is
the demand, and in such a case, the plaintiff is entitled to recover
his costs and damages, although the bank has been at all times
ready and able to pay. (6 Shep. 240.) By stipulating for no time
and place, for the redemption of her bills, she is liable to suit at
any time. That is her contract with the holder of her bills. She
may, however, stipulate that her notes shall be paid at a place
certain, and in that event we are disposed to hold a different rule
from that laid down in regard to private paper of like character.
In that event, we hold that a demand at the place specified, will be
preliminary to a suit, and of course ought to be averred and proved.
Instead of throwing upon the defendant the burden of pleading
and proving readiness to pay at the place specified, and giving him
upon such place and proof, the benefit of a discharge from costs
and damages, as in case of notes and bills, we hold that a plaintiff must make demand, at the peril of having his suit dismissed,
who seeks to recover upon such a bank note. A failure to make
demand at the time (if time is also specified) will not discharge the
bank, for the demand may be made afterwards.
We are disposed
to give the bank the opportunity of redeeming her bills before she
is liable to suit-to make the right of action to depend upon the
demand by the holder, and the default of the bank in not paying
at the time of the demand. And upon the suit after demand and
refusal to pay, the plaintiff will be entitled to recover his costs and
damages. This rule as to bank bills payable on demand, at a designated place we adopt upon the grouid of public policy, and it may
be made to apply to all future issues of all banks of the State,
for there is nothing to prevent all the banks from making their bills
payable at a particular place. The public are interested in this
question, as well as stockholders and bill holders. Bank bills subserve the purposes of money in the ordindry dealings of the people. They constitute the circulating medium of the country; they
constitute its currency. To preserve that sound, is a paramount
object of interest and duty to all departments of the government.
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Inasmuch as that is indefinitely diffused-consisting of a vast
number of bills of different denominations, and in the hands of the
people at divers, remote and unascertainable points; it is unreasonable to hold the bank bound to go to the holder, with a tender to redeem, or to hold it in default if it does not make the tender. On
the other hand, it is no unreasonable requirement to constrain the
holder to present the bills at the place designated, before suit.
It is his interest not to demand redemption, so long as he feels that
the notes are sound, because it is his interest to maintain them in
circulation, and thereby preserve the credit of the bank. And
why should he sue when the object of the suit can be accomplished
by a demand. To avoid demands, and thus maintain their issues
in circulation, is the policy of the banks. This policy is best proIt is there.
moted by prompt payment when demands are made.
fore a reasonable presumption that banks able to pay, will promptly
pay upon demand. The credit of a bank is as delicate as the honor
of a lady. Upon that credit, is more or less dependent every
interest of property, industry and trade. It would not, therefore,
be wise to subject it to be impaired by unnecessary suits, instigated
it may be, by the cupidity of private citizens, or the lust of rival
-institutions. Whilst we thus guard the interests of the banks, and
through them the interest of the public at large, it is necessary to
look also to the interest and convenience of individuals. The
holder should be notified with definiteness and precision, of the
It is not enough to leave him
place where he is to make demand.
to infer that he is to make the demand at the counter of the bank.
For although its locality is fixed by law, and may be a matter of
public notoriety, yet it may not in fact, be known to him. He
should be informed on the face of the bill, not in general terms,
but by a precise designation. One of the bills in this case, is payable at Rome; that is not sufficient. Like Imperial Bome, our
Georgia.-'omeis said to sit upon's~ven hills; upon which of these
- plain man- from some distant limleV or farmI house, is expected to
make demand, might be difficult foi- iin to determihe.' And when
he has made a demand, as best lie may, it may become a question
of legal contestation, vhether he hs made it in the right place.

692
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It should have been made payable at the banking house of the
institution at Rome, or at the house ef A. B. & Co., at Rome,
or at some place so clearly designated as to leave no doubt or uncertainty as to its identification., This bill is therefore a bill payable generally on demand, and so we rule. We hold, therefore, as
to both the bills, that the Court erred in excluding them on the
ground that no demand was averred or proven.
It was objected to the admissibility of these bank bills, in evidence farther, that upon their face they were barred by the statute
The Court sustained this objection also. -More
of limitations.
than the statutory term had expired, commencing at the respective
Upon exception to this ruling, we are now to
dates of the bills.
determine whether our statute of limitations applies to bank notes
in favor of the bank issuing them. We are confident that the
bank is not protected by the lapse of the statutory term, commencing witlh the note, as the Court below held, and that as' a general rule, the statute had no application to bank notes. The reason
is in the language, of Ld. .Mansfield, in Miller vs. Race, "that
these bills are not like notes of exchange, mere securities or documents for debts, nor are so esteemed, but are treated as money in
the ordinary course and transactions of business by the general
consent of mankind." (1 Burr. 457.) Whilst bank notes occupy
for some purposes the position of securities, yet in addition, they
are considered and subserve the purpose of money. Lord Hardwicke
in Soutwoat vs. Watson, speaking of a note of the Bank of
England, says "it has been said that these ought to be considered
only as a security for money, but I am of opinion they must
-be taken according to the common usage and notion of bank notes,
which are Aways considered as. cash, and made payable to bearer."
(3 Atk. R, 282.) See also, 11th Wend. R., 101. Bullard vs.
Bell, 1 Mason's R. 252.) Solomons vs. Tile Bank of -England,
13 East R. 135. Note-Story on Prom. Notes, §501. They
are payable on demand by authority of the charter; (Prince, 131).
They are negotiable by delivery; they pass in a bequest of the
testator's money or cash; (1 Scho. & Lefr. 318, 319; 11 Vesey.
662). Possession is pima faoie evidence of property in them;
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Chitty on Bills, 523; 2 Campb. R. 5; 1 Camp. R. 551). The
holder is not affected by the fraud of a previous holder in obtaining
them, unless he in privity with him, (13 East R. 135.) They
are never over-due, and not liable to any equities between the
bank and parties who have subsequently received them, or between
intermediate parties; (Story on Prom. Note§, § 501). These
qualities fit them for currency, and some of them distinguish them
from the mere evidences of a debt. They are not money by
authority of law, but are considered so by usage and the course of
business, and by the consent of the people. They are issued for
the purpose of being used as money by the banks, and the State is
a party to the consent that they shall so be considered, because the
power to issue is a grant from the Legislature. Thus made money
practically, it would destroy their monetary character to apply to
them in their character of securities, for the payment of money, a
limitation. If the bank is protected by a limitation, then is that
protection an injury, for it would have the effect of preventing the
circulation of a bill for a time longer than six years. Let that be
understood to be the law, and inevitably, almost every bill issued
would be returned once in six years. A: protracted circulation,
which is an object so desirable to banks, would thus be impossible,
How can a limitation law be applied to that, which, without much
perversion of truth, may be said to be like .Melchesidek, without.
beginning of days or end of life. It has no beginning upon its
face, for its date is no evidence of the time it was issued; it may
bear date to-day, and be issued to-morrow, or next year; or it m .y
be issued to-day, and returned to-morrow, and re-issued the next
day; or it may not be issued at all, until barred by time, commencing to run from its date. If it could be barred at all, it would
seem that the starting point of the statute ought to be the time of
its issue; and how shall the world so know that, as to exercise a
necessary diligence in suing within time ? Nor has it an end of
life, because it is never over-due. If, as Judge Story says, it is
never over-due, no matter when issued, or how often re-issued, but
it is always an immature representation of a legal tender; when
shall the statute commence to run? Shall it be said from the time

